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Abstract
The Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes reveal that expected utility theory is problematical when real sub-
jects take decisions under uncertainty. Suitable generalizations of expected utility exist which attempt
to solve the Ellsberg paradox, but none of them provides a satisfactory solution of the Machina paradox.
In this paper we elaborate a quantum model in Hilbert space describing the Ellsberg situation and also
the Machina situation, and show that we can model the specific aspect of the Machina situation that is
unable to be modeled within the existing generalizations of expected utility.
Keywords: Ellsberg paradox, Machina paradox, ambiguity aversion, quantum modeling
1 Introduction
In economics, the predominant model of decision making is the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) [1, 2].
Notwithstanding its simplicity, mathematical tractability and predictive success, the empirical validity
of EUT at the individual level is questionable. Indeed, examples exist in the literature which show an
inconsistency between real preferences and the predictions of EUT. These deviations were put forward by
considering specific situations of uncertainty often commonly referred to now as paradoxes [3, 4].
EUT was formally developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1]. They presented a set of axioms
that allow to represent decision–maker preferences over the set of acts (functions from the set of states
of the world into the set of consequences) by the functional Epu(.), for some real–valued Bernoulli utility
function u on the set of consequences and an objective probability measure p on the set of states of the
nature. An important aspect of EUT concerns the treatment of uncertainty. Knight had highlighted the
difference between risk and uncertainty reserving the term risk for ventures that can be described by
known (or physical) probabilities, and the term uncertainty to refer to situations in which agents did not
know the probabilities associated with each of the possible outcomes of an act [5]. However, probabilities in
the von Neumann and Morgenstern modeling are objectively or, physically, given. Later, Savage extended
1
Act red yellow black
f1 12$ 0$ 0$
f2 0$ 0$ 12$
f3 12$ 12$ 0$
f4 0$ 12$ 12$
Table 1: The payoff matrix for the Ellsberg paradox situation.
EUT allowing agents to construct their own subjective probabilities when physical probabilities are not
available [2]. Then according to Savage’s model, the distinction put forward by Knight seems to be
irrelevant. Ellsberg’s experiments instead showed that Knightian’s distinction is empirically meaningful
[3]. In particular, he presented the following experiment. Consider one urn with thirty red balls and sixty
balls that are either yellow or black, the latter in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn from the urn.
Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 defined in Table 1. When
asked to rank these gambles most of the persons choose to bet on f1 over f2 and f4 over f3. This empirical
result cannot be explained by EUT. In fact, we can see that individuals’ ranking of the sub–acts [12 on
red; 0 on black] versus [0 on red; 12 on black] depends upon whether the event yellow yields a payoff of 0
or 12, contrary to what is suggested by the Sure–Thing principle, an important axiom of Savage’s model.
Nevertheless, these choices have a direct intuition: f1 offers the 12 prize with an objective probability of
1/3, and f2 offers the same prize but in an element of the subjective partition {black, yellow}. In the same
way, f4 offers the prize with an objective probability of 2/3, whereas f3 offers the same payoff on the union
of the unambiguous event red and the ambiguous event yellow. Thus, in both cases the unambiguous bet
is preferred to its ambiguous counterpart, a phenomenon called by Ellsberg ambiguity aversion.
After the work of Ellsberg many extensions of EUT have been developed to represent this kind of
preferences, all replacing the Sure–Thing Principle by weaker axioms. The first extension is Choquet Ex-
pected Utility also known as expected utility with non–additive probabilities [6]. This model considered a
subjective non–additive probability (capacity) over the states of nature instead of a subjective probability.
Thus, decision–makers could underestimate or overestimate probabilities in the Ellsberg experiment and
the ambiguity aversion is equivalent to the convexity of the capacity (pessimistic beliefs). A second ap-
proach is the Max−Min Expected Utility, or expected utility with multi–prior [7]. In this case the lack of
knowledge about the states of nature of the decision–maker cannot be represented by a unique probability
measure, instead he or she thinks are relevant a set of probability measures, then an act f is preferred to g
if minp∈P Epu(f) > minp∈P Epu(f), where P is a convex and closed set of additive probabilities measures.
The ambiguity aversion is represented by the pessimistic beliefs of the agent which takes decisions consid-
ering the worst probabilistic scenario. The third model is Variational Preferences [8], and it is a dynamic
generalization of the Max-Min expected utility. In this case agents rank acts according to the criterion:
infp∈△{Epu(f) + c(p)}, where c(p) is a closed and convex penalty function associated with the probability
election. Finally, the Second Order Probabilities approach [9] proposes a model of preferences over acts
such that the decision–maker prefers an act f to an act g if and only if Eµφ(Epu(f)) ≥ Eµφ(Epu(g)),
where E is the expectation operator, u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, φ is an increasing
transformation, and µ is a subjective probability over the set of probability measures p that the decision–
maker thinks are feasible. In this kind of model the ambiguity aversion is represented by the concavity of
the transformation φ.
Notwithstanding the models above have been widely used in economics and finance, they are not absent
of critics (see, e.g., [4, 10]). In the same spirit as Ellsberg, Machina proposed an example introducing a
trade off between ambiguity aversion and Bayesian advantages that cannot be represented by the Choquet
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Act E1 E2 E3 E4
f1 202 202 101 101
f2 202 101 202 101
f3 303 202 101 0
f4 303 101 202 0
Table 2: The payoff matrix for the Machina paradox situation.
expected utility model [4]. Recently it was proved that no one of the mentioned extensions of EUT can
represent the behavior described by the Machina paradox [11]. For the Machina paradox an experiment is
considered consisting of an urn with four kind of different balls identified with a number between 1 and 4.
The amount of balls with the number 1 plus the amount of balls with the number 2 is fifty and the amount
of balls with the number 3 plus the amount of balls with the number 4 is fifty–one. Agents are asked to
rank the following set of acts. The event Ej indicates that a ball with a number j has been drawn from
the urn, the act f1 has been defined as contingent payoff in each event, so that in E1, f1 pays 202, in E2,
f1 pays 202, and so on. Equally are defined f2, f3 and f4. Then, free of charge a person is asked to bet
on f1 or to bet on f2, if he or she are sufficiently uncertainty averse then will prefer f1 instead f2, because
f1 has not ambiguity in its payoffs although f2 presents a slight Bayesian advantage due to the 51 balls
may yield 202. The person is also asked to bet on f3 or f4. In this case, both acts present ambiguity in
their payoffs, there is not an informational advantage between them. Thus a decision–maker who values
unambiguous information would be indifferent between f3 and f4. On the other hand f4 benefits from the
51 balls, hence in this case the Bayesian advantage implies that f4 ≻ f3. The paradox appears because
none of the reviewed models can represent this dual behavior. As a consequence, the Machina paradox, as
well as the construction of a unified framework explaining both the Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes, are
still open problems in decision making.
Ambiguity in economics is typically considered as a situation without a unique probability model
describing it as opposed to risk, which is defined as a situation with such a probability model describing it.
It is however presupposed usually that a classical probability model is considered, defined on a σ–algebra of
events. In the above approaches generalizing EUT [6, 7, 8, 9], more general structures are considered than
that of a single classical probability model on a σ–algebra. Having looked in detail at the above mentioned
structural generalizations, it can be noticed however that they all envisage generalizations of some specific
aspects of the traditional situation of one classical probability model on one σ–algebra. Recently we have
also proposed an approach to this problem, introducing the notion of contextual risk, inspired by the
probability structure of quantum mechanics, which is intrinsically different from a classical probability on
a σ-algebra, the set of events is indeed not a Boolean algebra [12, 13, 14, 15].
In the present article we work out a direct mathematical representation of the Ellsberg and Machina
paradox situations, in the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, hence by using a complex Hilbert
space, and representing the probability measures by projection valued measures on this complex Hilbert
space. As we will see when we explain the details of the Hilbert space representation of Ellsberg and
Machina, it is not only the structure of the probability models which is essentially different from the known
approaches – projection valued measures instead of σ–algebra valued measures – but also the way in which
states are represented in quantum mechanics, i.e. by unit vectors of the Hilbert space, brings in an essential
different aspect, coping both mathematically and intuitively, with the notion of ambiguity as introduced
in economics.
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2 A quantum model for the Ellsberg paradox
To work out a quantum model for the Ellsberg paradox situation we consider the example resumed in Tab.
1, Sec. 1. We will realize the quantum model in the three dimensional complex Hilbert space C3. Let us
denote its canonical basis by the vectors {|1, 0, 0〉, |0, 1, 0〉, |0, 0, 1〉}.
For the sake of clarity, we introduce the model in different steps. First, we define the part of the model,
which we will refer to as the conceptual Ellsberg entity, as it consists of the Ellsberg situation without
considering the different actions and also without considering the person and the bet to be taken. Hence
it is the situation of the urn with 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls in unknown proportion. In
the next steps we will add the remaining elements.
Already in the first part the presence of the ambiguity can be taken into account mathematically in
a specific way by the quantum mechanical formalism. To this aim we introduce a quantum mechanical
context e, represented by means of the spectral family {Pr, Pyb}, where Pr is the one dimensional orthogonal
projection operator on the subspace generated by the vector |1, 0, 0〉, and Pyb is the two dimensional
orthogonal projection operator on the subspace generated by the vectors |0, 1, 0〉 and |0, 0, 1〉, {Pr, Pyb} is
indeed a spectral family, since Pr ⊥ Pyb and Pr + Pyb = 1. Contexts, or more specifically measurement
contexts, are indeed represented by spectral families of orthogonal projection operators, or by a self–adjoint
operator determined by such a family. A state in quantum mechanics is represented by a unit vector of
the complex Hilbert space. For example, the vector
|vry〉 = |1/
√
3 · eiθr ,
√
2/3 · eiθy , 0〉 (1)
can be used to represent a state describing the Ellsberg situation. Indeed, we have
|〈1, 0, 0|vry〉|2 = 〈vry|1, 0, 0〉〈1, 0, 0|vry 〉 =‖ Pr|vry〉 ‖2= 1/3 (2)
which shows that the probability for ‘red’ in the state represented by |vry〉 equals 1/3. On the other hand,
we have
‖Pyb|vry〉‖2 = 〈0,
√
2/3 · eiθy , 0|0,
√
2/3 · eiθy , 0〉 = 2/3 (3)
which shows that the probability for ‘yellow or black’ in the state represented by |vry〉 is 2/3. But this is
not the only state describing the Ellsberg situation, the set of all such states (Ellsberg state set) is
ΣElls = {pv : |v〉 = |1/
√
3 · eiθr , ρyeiθy , ρbeiθb〉 | 0 ≤ ρy, ρb, ρ2y + ρ2b = 2/3} (4)
which is a subset of C3. A state contained in ΣElls, together with the context e represented by the spectral
family {Pr, Pyb}, delivers a quantum description of the Ellsberg situation.
We come now to the second step, namely the introduction of a description of the different actions f1,
f2, f3 and f4. Here a second measurement context is introduced which we denote by g. It describes the ball
taken out of the urn, and its color verified, red, yellow or black. Also g is represented by a spectral family
of orthogonal projection operators {Pr, Py, Pb}, where Pr is already defined, while Py is the orthogonal
projection operator on |0, 1, 0〉 and Pb is the orthogonal projection operator on |0, 0, 1〉. This means that
the probabilities, given a state pv represented by the vector |v〉 = |ρreiθr , ρyeiθy , ρbeiθb〉, are
µr(g, pv) =‖ Pr|v〉 ‖2= 〈v|Pr |v〉 = ρ2r (5)
µy(g, pv) =‖ Py|v〉 ‖2= 〈v|Py |v〉 = ρ2y (6)
µb(g, pv) =‖ Pb|v〉 ‖2= 〈v|Pb|v〉 = ρ2b (7)
where µr(g, pv), µy(g, pv) and µb(g, pv) are the probabilities to draw a red ball, a yellow ball and a black
ball, respectively, in the state pv. Of course, if pv ∈ ΣElls we require that ρ2r = 1/3 and ρ2y + ρ2b = 2/3.
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The different actions f1, f2, f3 and f4 are observables, and hence represented by self-adjoint operators,
built all on the spectral decomposition {Pr, Py , Pb}.
fˆ1 = 12$Pr fˆ2 = 12$Pb fˆ3 = 12$Pr + 12$Py fˆ4 = 12$Py + 12$Pb = 12$Pyb (8)
Let us analyze now the expected payoffs connected with the different acts, or the utility. Let us remark
here that for reasons of simplicity, we identify the utility with the expected payoff, although of course in
general the utility is a much more general variable. This implies that we are considering a risk neutral
agent. Hence, consider an arbitrary state pv ∈ ΣElls and the acts f1 and f4. We have
U(f1, g, pv) = 〈v|fˆ1|v〉 = 12$〈v|Pr |v〉 = 12$ · 1/3 = 4$ (9)
U(f4, g, pv) = 〈v|fˆ4|v〉 = 12$〈v|Pyb |v〉 = 12$ · 2/3 = 8$ (10)
which shows that both these utilities are completely independent of the considered state of ΣElls. They are
ambiguity free. Consider now the acts f2 and f3, and again an arbitrary state pv ∈ ΣElls. We have
U(f2, g, pv) = 〈v|fˆ2|v〉 = 12$〈v|Pb|v〉 = 12$µb(g, pv) (11)
U(f3, g, pv) = 〈v|fˆ3|v〉 = 12$〈v|(Pr + Py)|v〉 = 12$(µr(g, pv) + µy(g, pv)) (12)
which shows that both utilities depend heavily on the state pv, due to the ambiguity where the two acts
are confronted with.
Let us now consider some extreme cases to see explicitly the dependence on the state. Consider, e.g.,
the states pvry , introduced in (1), and pvrb represented by the vector |vrb〉 = |1/
√
3 · eiφr , 0,
√
2/3 · eiθb〉.
These states give rise for the act f2 to utilities
U(f2, g, pvry) = 12$µb(g, pvry) = 12$ · 0 = 0$ (13)
U(f2, g, pvrb) = 12$µb(g, pvrb) = 12$ · 2/3 = 8$. (14)
This shows that a state pvrb exists within the realm of ambiguity, where the utility of act f2 is greater than
the utility of act f1, and also a state pvry exists within the realm of ambiguity, where the utility of act f2
is smaller than the utility of act f1. If we look at act f3, we find for the two considered extreme states the
following utilities
U(f3, g, pvry ) = 12$(µr(g, pvry) + µy(g, pvry)) = 12$(1/3 + 2/3) = 12$ (15)
U(f3, g, pvrb) = 12$(µr(g, pvrb) + µy(g, pvrb)) = 12$(1/3 + 0) = 4$. (16)
We are in a very similar situation, namely one of the states gives rise to a greater utility, while the other
gives rise to a smaller utility than the independent one obtained in act f4.
We come finally to the third step, and take into account the presence of the ambiguity in a proper way.
Relying on quantum mechanical modeling of situations that violate the Sure–Thing Principle, such as the
Hawaii situation [17], we put forward the hypothesis that the two extreme states pvry and pvrb play a role
in the mind of the person that is asked to bet. Hence, it is a superposition state of these two states that
will guide the decision of the person to bet. Let us construct a general superposition state pvs of these two
states. Hence the vector |vs〉 representing pvs can be written as follows
|vs〉 = aeiα|vrb〉+ beiβ |vry〉 (17)
where a, b, α and β are chosen in such a way that 〈vs|vs〉 = 1, which means that 1 = (ae−iα〈vrb| +
be−iβ〈vry|)(aeiα|vrb〉+ beiβ |vry〉) = a2 + b2 + 2ab/3 · cos(β − α+ θr − φr), from which follows that
cos(β − α+ θr − φr) = 3(1− a2 − b2)/2ab (18)
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Straightforward calculations show that the transition probabilities in the superposition state pvs are
given by
|〈1, 0, 0|vs〉|2 = 1/3 · (3− 2a2 − 2b2) = µr(g, pvs) (19)
|〈0, 1, 0|vs〉|2 = 2/3 · b2 = µy(g, pvs) (20)
|〈0, 0, 1|vs〉|2 = 2/3 · a2 = µb(g, pvs) (21)
and that we can represent a general superposition state as
|vs〉 = 1/
√
3 · |aei(α+φr) + bei(β+θr),
√
2bei(β+θy),
√
2aei(α+θb)〉 (22)
and that the utilities corresponding to the observables of the different actions are given by
U(f1, g, pvs) = 〈vs|fˆ1|vs〉 = 12$ · 1/3 · (3− 2a2 − 2b2) = 4$ · (3− 2a2 − 2b2) (23)
U(f2, g, pvs) = 〈vs|fˆ2|vs〉 = 12$ · 2/3 · a2 = 4$ · 2a2 (24)
U(f3, g, pvs) = 〈vs|fˆ3|vs〉 = 12$ · 1/3 · (3− 2a2 − 2b2) + 12$ · 2/3 · b2 = 4$ · (3− 2a2) (25)
U(f4, g, pvs) = 〈vs|fˆ4|vs〉 = 12$ · 2/3 · b2 + 12$ · 2/3 · a2 = 4$(2a2 + 2b2) (26)
We can see that it is not necessarily the case that µr(g, pvs) = 1/3, which means that choices of a and b can
be made such that the superposition state pvs is not a state contained in ΣElls. The reason is that ΣElls is
not a linearly closed subset of C3. A conservative choice within our quantum modeling is that we require
the superposition state to be an element of ΣElls – we plan in future work to explore situations where this
is not the case, e.g. situations of interference with respect to Ellsberg-type examples – and this leads to
1/3 = µr(g, pvs) = 1/3 · (3− 2a2 − 2b2)⇔ a2 + b2 = 1 (27)
which implies that cos(β − α + θr − φr) = 0 and hence β = pi/2 + α− θr + φr. Let us construct now two
examples of superposition states that conserve the 1/3 probability for drawing a red ball, and hence are
conservative superpositions, and express the ambiguity as is thought to be the case in the Ellsberg paradox
situation. The first state refers to the comparison for a bet between f1 and f2. The ambiguity of not
knowing the number of yellow and black balls in the urn, only their sum to be 60, as compared to knowing
the number of red balls in the urn to be 30, gives rise to the thought that ‘eventually there are perhaps
almost no black balls and hence an abundance of yellow balls’. Jointly, and in superposition, the thought
also comes that ‘it is of course also possible that there are more black balls than yellow balls’. These two
thoughts in superposition, are mathematically represented by a state pvs . The state pvs will be closer to
pvry , the extreme state with no black balls, if the person has a lot of ambiguity aversion, while it will be
closer to pvrb , the extreme state with no yellow balls, if the person is attracted by the ambiguity. Hence,
these two tendencies are expressed by the values of a and b in the superposition state. If we consider again
the utilities, this time with a2 + b2 = 1, we have
U(f1, g, pvs) = 4$ U(f2, g, pvs) = 4$ · 2a2 (28)
U(f3, g, pvs) = 4$ · (3− 2a2) U(f4, g, pvs) = 8$ (29)
So, for a2 < 1/2, which exactly means that the superposition state pvs is closer to the state pvry than to
the state pvrb , we have that U(f2, g, pvs) < U(f1, g, pvs), and hence a person with strong ambiguity aversion
in the situation of the first bet, will then prefer to bet on f1 and not on f2. Let us choose a concrete
state for the bet between f1 and f2, and call it pv12s , and denote its superposition state by |v12s 〉. Hence,
for |v12s 〉 we take a = 1/2 and b =
√
3/2 and hence a2 = 1/4 and b2 = 3/4. For the angles we must have
β − α+ θr − φr = pi/2, hence let us choose θr = φr = 0, α = 0, and β = pi/2. This gives us
|v12s 〉 = 1/2
√
3 · |1 +
√
3eipi/2,
√
2
√
3eipi/2,
√
2〉 = 1/2
√
3 · |1 + i
√
3, i
√
6,
√
2〉 (30)
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On the other hand, for 1/2 < a2, which means that the superposition state is closer to the state pvrb than
to the state pvry , we have that U(f3, g, pvs) < U(f4, g, pvs), and hence a person with strong ambiguity
aversion in the situation of the second bet, will then prefer to bet on f4 and not on f3. Also for this case
we construct an explicit state, let us call it pv34s , and denote it by the vector |v34s 〉. Hence, for |v34s 〉 we take
a =
√
3/2 and b = 1/2 and hence a2 = 3/4 and b2 = 1/4. For the angles we must have β−α+θr−φr = pi/2,
hence let us choose θr = φr = 0, α = 0, and β = pi/2. This gives us
|v34s 〉 = 1/2
√
3 · |
√
3 + eipi/2,
√
2eipi/2,
√
2
√
3〉 = 1/2
√
3 · |
√
3 + i, i
√
2,
√
6〉 (31)
3 A quantum model for the Machina paradox
In this section we elaborate a quantum model for the Machina paradox which is similar to the model
constructed for the Ellsberg paradox. To this aim let us consider again the payoff matrix for the Machina
situation in Tab. 2, Sec. 1.
We consider the four dimensional complex Hilbert space C4 endowed with the canonical basis {|1, 0, 0, 0〉,
|0, 1, 0, 0〉, |0, 0, 1, 0〉, |0, 0, 0, 1〉}. First, we describe the conceptual Machina entity, consisting of the Machina
situation without the different actions and also without the person and the bet to be taken. Hence it is the
situation of the urn with 50 balls of type 1 or type 2 and 51 balls of type 3 or type 4. This is described by
the context e represented by the spectral family {P12, P34}, where P12 is the two dimensional orthogonal
projection operator on the subspace generated by {|1, 0, 0, 0〉, |0, 1, 0, 0〉}, and P34 is the two dimensional
orthogonal projection operator on the subspace generated by {|0, 0, 1, 0〉, |0, 0, 0, 1〉}.
Then, as in Sec. 2, let us define the set of states of the Machina situation which we call the Machina
state set
ΣMach = {pv : |v〉 = |v1, v2, v3, v4〉 | |v1|2 + |v2|2 = 50/101, |v3 |2 + |v4|2 = 51/101}. (32)
If a state is contained in ΣMach, this state delivers a quantum description of the Machina situation, together
with the measurement e represented by the spectral family {P12, P34} in C4.
We come now to the second step, namely the introduction of a description of the different actions f1, f2,
f3 and f4, by means of the introduction of a second measurement context which we denote by g, and which
describes how a ball is taken from the urn, and it is verified whether it is of type 1, 2, 3 or 4. Hence g is
represented by the spectral family {P1, P2, P3, P4}, where P1, P2, P3 and P4 are the orthogonal projection
operators on the subspaces generated by |1, 0, 0, 0〉, |0, 1, 0, 0〉, |0, 0, 1, 0〉 and |0, 0, 0, 1〉, respectively. Thus,
the probability µj(g, pv) to draw a ball of type j, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, in the state pv represented by the vector
|v〉 = |v1, v2, v3, v4〉, is given by
µ1(g, pv) = 〈v|P1|v〉 = |v1|2, µ2(g, pv) = 〈v|P2|v〉 = |v2|2, (33)
µ3(g, pv) = 〈v|P3|v〉 = |v3|2, µ4(g, pv) = 〈v|P4|v〉 = |v4|2, (34)
Let us then calculate the expected utilities associated with each of the feasible acts, proceeding as in
the Ellsberg case. The acts f1 to f4 are observables, we represent them by self-adjoint operators built
on the spectral family {P1, P2, P3, P4} in the following way: fˆ1 = $202P1 + $202P2 + $101P3 + $101P4,
fˆ2 = $202P1 + $101P2 + $202P3 + $101P4, fˆ3 = $303P1 + $202P2 + $101P3 + $0P4 and fˆ4 = $303P1 +
$101P2 + $202P3 + $0P4.
Then we find
U(f1, pv) = 202 · |v1|2 + 202 · |v2|2 + 101 · |v3|2 + 101 · |v4|2 = 151 (35)
U(f2, pv) = 202|v1|2 + 101|v2|2 + 202|v3|2 + 101|v4|2 (36)
U(f3, pv) = 303|v1|2 + 202|v2|2 + 101|v3|2 (37)
U(f4, pv) = 303|v1|2 + 101|v2|2 + 202|v3|2 (38)
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and see that only U(f1, pv) is independent of pv. Finally, as we did in the case of Ellsberg, let us calculate
the utility for the three acts f2, f3 and f4 for the Machina entity being in the extreme states pv13 and pv24
represented by the vectors
|v13〉 = |
√
50/101 · eiθ1 , 0,
√
51/101 · eiθ3 , 0〉 (39)
|v24〉 =| 0,
√
50/101 · eiθ2 , 0,
√
51/101 · eiθ4〉 (40)
We have U(f2, pv13) = 202, U(f3, pv13) = 201, U(f4, pv13) = 252, U(f2, pv24) = 101, U(f3, pv24) = 100 and
U(f4, pv24) = 50, which shows that for the state pv13 the utilities of all three acts f2, f3 and f4 are maximal,
and much bigger than the utility of f1 as state independent act without ambiguity. On the contrary, for
the state pv24 , we are in the inverse situation, for all three acts f2, f3 and f4 the utilities are minimal, and
much smaller than the utility of act f1. Let us consider a superposition state |vs〉 of these two extreme
states
|vs〉 = aeiα|v13〉+ beiβ|v24〉 (41)
where a, b are such that a2 + b2 = 1, and α and β are arbitrary, because indeed this makes 〈vs|vs〉 = 1,
because |v13〉 and |v24〉 are orthogonal. We have
〈1, 0, 0, 0|vs〉 = aeiα〈1, 0, 0, 0|v13〉+ beiβ〈1, 0, 0, 0|v24〉 = a
√
50/101ei(α+θ1) (42)
〈0, 1, 0, 0|vs〉 = aeiα〈0, 1, 0, 0|v13〉+ beiβ〈0, 1, 0, 0|v24〉 = b
√
50/101ei(β+θ2) (43)
〈0, 0, 1, 0|vs〉 = aeiα〈0, 0, 1, 0|v13〉+ beiβ〈0, 0, 1, 0|v24〉 = a
√
51/101ei(α+θ3) (44)
〈0, 0, 0, 1|vs〉 = aeiα〈0, 0, 0, 1|v13〉+ beiβ〈0, 0, 0, 1|v24〉 = b
√
51/101ei(β+θ4) (45)
which shows that
|〈1, 0, 0, 0|vs〉|2 = 50a2/101 = µ1(g, pvs) (46)
|〈0, 1, 0, 0|vs〉|2 = 50b2/101 = µ2(g, pvs) (47)
|〈0, 0, 1, 0|vs〉|2 = 51a2/101 = µ3(g, pvs) (48)
|〈0, 0, 0, 1|vs〉|2 = 51b2/101 = µ4(g, pvs) (49)
This means that for the utilities in this superposition state we find
U(f1, pv) = 202 · 50a2/101 + 202 · 50b2/101 + 101 · 51a2/101 + 101 · 51b2/101
= 2 · 50(a2 + b2) + 51(a2 + b2) = 151 (50)
U(f2, pv) = 202 · 50a2/101 + 101 · 50b2/101 + 202 · 51a2/101 + 101 · 51b2/101
= 2 · 50a2 + 50b2 + 2 · 51a2 + 51b2 = 202a2 + 101b2 (51)
U(f3, pv) = 303 · 50a2/101 + 202 · 50b2/101 + 101 · 51a2/101
= 3 · 50a2 + 2 · 50b2 + 51a2 = 201a2 + 100b2 (52)
U(f4, pv) = 303 · 50a2/101 + 101 · 50b2/101 + 202 · 51a2/101
= 3 · 50a2 + 50b2 + 2 · 51a2 = 252a2 + 50b2 (53)
An important fact to mention before we further our quantum description, is that there is ample and
convincing experimental evidence showing that ambiguity aversion is not related to the size of the payoffs
involved [16]. This means that if we want to model the effect of ambiguity, we should identify it mainly on
the level of the states of the Ellsberg and Machina situations, and only on the level of the utilities as far as
we take into account that it should not be linked to the size of the payoffs. This is exactly what we have
done in our quantum model in the case of the Ellsberg paradox situation. Indeed, in equation (17), we have
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considered a superposition state of the two extreme ambiguity states, and put forward the hypothesis that
depending on the ambiguity aversion of a person, he or she will consider the Ellsberg conceptual entity in
a state closer to one, or to the other, of the extreme states. Let us analyze the Machina situation in an
analogous way now.
For example, consider the situation of a bet on f1 or f2. There is no ambiguity on f1, since all states give
rise to the same payoff, whereas there is a lot of ambiguity on f2. A person with strong ambiguity aversion
will consider the Machina conceptual entity to be in a superposition state close to the extreme state pv24 ,
hence the value of a will be small, and the value of b large. Let us introduce the following values as an
example to make a quantitative calculation possible, we take a = 1/
√
10 and b = 3/
√
10. Then we have
U(f1, pv) = 151, and U(f2, pv) = 202/10 + 101 · 9/10 = 20.2 + 90.9 = 111.1. Hence, U(f2, pv) < U(f1, pv),
and this person will bet on f1 and not on f2.
Consider now the situation of a bet on f3 or f4. In this case, for both actions there is an equal amount
of ambiguity. This means that in principle no preference is present on the level of the ‘ambiguity choice’
with respect to the superposition state that a person will consider the Machina conceptual entity to be
in. Statistically this amounts to the superposition state being with equal values of a and b and hence
we have a = b = 1/
√
2. Let us calculate for these values of a and b the utilities corresponding to these
actions. We have U(f3, pv) = 201/2+100/2 = 150.5 and U(f4, pv) = 252/2+50/2 = 151. This means that
U(f3, pv) < U(f4, pv) and hence the person will bet on f4 and not on f3.
We conclude with some remarks.
(i) The subjective preference in traditional economics approaches is incorporated in our approach in the
quantum state, which represents what we have called the conceptual entity of the Ellsberg and Machina
paradox situations. Hence, the subjective probabilities of the traditional economics approaches are captured
by this quantum state, since it is introduced as describing the ‘conceptual entity’, and not the ’physical
entity’. At variance with existing proposals, the subjective preference, in our case incorporated in the
quantum state, can be different for each one of the acts fj, since it is not derived from the mathematical
structure of the state space, or of the structure of other aspects of the Machina situation modeling. In the
other approaches such a mathematical rule exists, which renders the Machina situation with f1 preferred
to f2 and f4 preferred to f3 impossible. We have just seen that this is not impossible in our modeling
scheme.
(ii) Since in our approach there is no mathematical rule for the subjective probability measure that
arises from the interaction of the person with the Machina conceptual entity, hence, from the interaction
between the conceptual landscape carried by the person and the Machina conceptual entity, there is no
problem to construct the exact probability measure, i.e. the exact superposition, that will model the
experimental data, in case real experimental data are collected for the Machina example.
(iii) All existing proposals mathematically lead to a subjective probability, hence in our quantum
model, to a specific superposition state, ‘as if this subjective probability i.e. this superposition state could
be determined from a theoretical perspective’. We believe that the specific structure of this probability
depends instead on the interaction of the betting person with the Ellsberg or Machina situation, and its
values should be determined experimentally.
We have not yet explicitly introduced the quantum mechanical model of the bet itself. This is indeed
another aspect of the quantum formalism where an essential deviation from the traditional economics
approaches is bound to take place. Indeed, the bet itself, as a decision process, can be modeled within
the same quantum mathematical formalism, by means of a spectral family of projection operators of a
self-adjoint operator. We have done this explicitly already for the Ellsberg situation, and were able to
model the experimental data of an experimental test of the Ellsberg paradox we published in [13]. Due to
space limitations of the present paper we decided to leave this part of the quantum mathematical model
of Ellsberg and Machina for a forthcoming publication.
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In future work we also plan to investigate the relation to the already existing and fruitful approaches
of introducing quantum structures in situations of decision under uncertainty in economics and decision
theory [18].
References
[1] von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University
Press, Princeton (1944)
[2] Savage, L.J.: The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York (1954)
[3] Ellsberg, D.: Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. Quart. J. Econ. 75(4), 643–669 (1961)
[4] Machina, M.J.: Risk, Ambiguity, and the Dark–dependence Axioms. Am. Econ. Rev. 99(1), 385–392
(2009)
[5] Knight, F.H.: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Houghton Mifflin, Boston (1921)
[6] I. Gilboa, Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-additive Probabilities, J. Math. Econ. 16,
65–88 (1987)
[7] Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D.: Maxmin Expected Utility With Non–unique Prior. J. Math. Econ. 18,
141–153 (1989)
[8] Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., Rustichini, A.: Dynamical Variational Preferences. The Carlo Alberto
Notebooks, 1, pp. 37 (2006)
[9] Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., Mukerji, S.: A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity.
Econometrica 73(6), 1849–1892 (2005)
[10] Epstein, L.G.: A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 579–608 (1999)
[11] Baillon, A., L’Haridon, O., Placido, L.: Ambiguity Models and the Machina Paradoxes. Am. Econ.
Rev. 1547, 1547–1560 (2011)
[12] Aerts, D., Broekaert, J., Czachor, M., D’Hooghe, B.: A Quantum-conceptual Explanation of Violations
of Expected Utility in Economics. Quantum Interaction. LNCS 7052, 192–198 (2011)
[13] Aerts, D., D’Hooghe, B., Sozzo, S.: A Quantum Cognition Analysis of the Ellsberg Paradox. Quantum
Interaction. LNCS 7052, 95–104 (2011)
[14] Aerts, D., Sozzo, S.: Quantum Structure in Economics: The Ellsberg Paradox. In: D’Ariano, M., et
al. (eds.) Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations–6, pp. 487–494. AIP, Melville, New York
(2012)
[15] Aerts, D., Sozzo, S.: Contextual Risk and Its Relevance in Economics; A Contextual Risk Model for
the Ellsberg Paradox. J. Eng. Sci. Tech. Rev. 4, 241–245; 246–250 (2012)
[16] Camerer, C.F.: Ambiguity Aversion and Non–additive Probability: Experimental Evidence, Models
and Applications. In: Luini, L. (Ed.) Uncertain Decisions: Bridging Theory and Experiments, pp.
53–80. Kluwer Acad. Pub., Dordrecht (1999)
[17] Aerts, D.: Quantum Structure in Cognition. J. Math. Psych. 53, 314–348 (2009)
[18] Busemeyer, J. R. and Lambert-Mogiliansky, A.: An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic
Decision-Making. Quantum Interaction. LNCS 5494, 113–127 (2009)
10
